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MILLER v. GRAFF
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF CHILDREN
Miller v. Graf 1
The Plaintiff, a little girl age four, was struck by the
Defendant's westbound taxicab as she was crossing a street
from South to North in the middle of the block. From a
directed verdict for the Defendant, the Plaintiff :appealed.
The Court, after deciding that there was sufficient evidence
of negligence, from skidmarks and other evidence of speed,
to allow the case to go to the jury, said:
"It is also plain that the child in this case cannot be
held guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of
law. In considering the question of contributory negli-
gence, the Court recognizes that a child is required to
exercise only that degree of care which a reasonably
careful child of the same age and intelligence would
exercise under similar circumstances. The mere fact
that a young child, when frightened or bewildered,
turns around in the street near one sidewalk and starts
to come back to the other sidewalk when called by the
screams of a parent is not necessarily evidence of negli-
gence. In this case the child was only four years old at
the time of the accident. We have definitely held that
a child four years old cannot be guilty of contributory
negligence under any circumstances."2
It is the place which this holding assumes in relation to
the line of Maryland precedents on the point which makes
the absolute rule here of some interest.
In support of the holding the Court cited Mahan v.
State,8 and Bozman v. State.4
The Mahan case dealt with a three year old boy who was
killed while walking along a rural street. The Court, in
discussing the appeal from the refusal of the Defendant's
contributory negligence prayer, said:
"For while in this state a child of tender years may
be guilty of negligence . . ., it is not held to the same
measure and kind of care that would be required of a
1 196 Md. 609,78 A. 2d 220 (1951).
2 Ibid, 619.
3 172 Md. 373, 191 A. 575 (1937).
'177 Md. 151, 9 A. 2d 60 (1939), noted 5 Md. L. Rev. 414, 418 (1941), which
discusses also the Mahan case, 8upra, n. 3.
1954]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
normal person of full age..., but only to that degree
of care which should be exercised by one of his age....
The Court nevertheless went on to say:
"The great weight of authority is opposed to the
proposition that a child a little over four years of age
can be guilty of contributory negligence."
In the Bozman case the child was a boy of eight years.
As part of its discussion of the lower court's refusal of a
directed verdict for contributory negligence, the Court said:
"Moreover, a child of tender years is not held to the
same measure and kind of care required of a reasonably
prudent adult, but only to that degree of care which
children of the same age would be expected to use
under similar circumstances. Thus, a child four years
of age cannot be guilty of contributory negligence un-
der any circumstances."7
It can be noted, therefore, that the absolute holding in
the Miller case is based upon two statements by way of
dicta, the former acknowledged to be at variance with the
then established Maryland rule, and the latter a purely
gratuitous one, inapplicable to the facts before the Court.
In opposition to the case noted, there are a number of
Maryland cases which hold that the question of the con-
tributory negligence of a child of four or less is one for the
jury under proper instructions. The Maryland case, form-
erly considered the classic in this area, is that of United
Railways Co. v. Carneal. There the Plaintiff was a little
girl not quite three years of age. Yet the Court held:
"In spite of the negligence of the plaintiff or of the
parents of the plaintiff, lawfully imputable to her, she
was still entitled to recover unless the jury should find
that after the motorman saw, or could have seen, her
peril he could not, by the exercise of ordinary care,
have avoided the accident. So far as her conduct was
concerned, she could only be held to such a degree of
care as might be expected from one of her age and in-
telligence.""
5 Supra, n. 3, 385.
8 Ibid.
7 Supra, n. 4, 155.
8110 Md. 211, 72 A. 771 (1909).
9 Ibid, 230.
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And further:
".... we think the question of contributory negli-
gence was properly left to the jury."1
The traditional rule was also applied in an even earlier
case where the infant plaintiff was a child of two years and
two months." In fact, the only absolute ruling before the
Miller case as to a minimum age below which a child can-
not as a matter of law be held guilty of contributory negli-
gence was Caroline County v. Beulah,2 where the Court
said:
"Obviously, a child six months old takes no care for
its own safety,..."3
Thus, prior to the principal case, the well established
rule that a child is required to exercise that degree of care
commensurate with its age, intelligence and experience 4
seems to have been applied in all cases without regard to
the tender years of the Plaintiff.
The disparity between the former Maryland rule and
that of other jurisdictions was specifically pointed out by
the Court in Zulver v. Roberts." There a seven year old
boy, while sleigh riding, collided with the Defendant's car.
It was held that:
"The first contention in respect to the court's ruling
on the prayers is that a boy of seven years of age, as a
matter of law, cannot be charged with contributory
negligence. It seems clear that the weight of authority
in this country outside of our state supports such a con-
tention, some of the courts holding that children under
the age of six are incapable of contributory negligence,
while the apparent majority fix seven as the age below
which they are conclusively presumed to be incapable.
This, however, is not the rule of this jurisdiction, it
being here held that the question is one to be submitted
to the jury under proper instructions."' 6
-1 bid, 231.
Balt. City Pass. Co. v. McDonnell, 43 Md. 534, 551 (1876).
153 Md. 221, 138 A. 25 (1927).
Ibid, 226.
"Coughlan v. B. & 0. R.R. Co., 24 Md. 84 (1866); B. & 0. R.R. Co. v.
Breinig, 25 Md. 378 (1866) ; B. & 0. R.R. Co. v. State, 30 Md. 77 (1869);
Bait. City Pass. Co. v. McDonnell, 8upra, n. 11; United Railways Co. v.
Carneal, 8upra, n. 8; Balto. & 0. R. Co. v. State, 141 Md. 520, 119 A. 244
(1922) ; Ottenheimer v. Molohan, 146 Md. 175, 126 A. 97 (1924) ; Slaysman v.
Gerst, 159 Md. 292, 150 A. 728 (1930).162 Md. 636, 161 A. 9 (1932).
'SIbid, 640.
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This lack of conformity of the Maryland rule was also
pointed out in State v. Wash. B. & A. R. Co.17 That case in-
volved the possible negligence of an infant plaintiff of four
years, two months and seven days, approximately the same
age as the Plaintiff in the principal case. There the Court
stated:
"... and for that reason we do not deem it necessary
to discuss them (Defendant's prayers) farther than to
say that while the proposition submitted by the first
prayer, that a child a little over four years old can be
guilty of contributory negligence, is opposed to the
great weight of authority .. ., it finds support in the
case of United Rwys. Co. v. Carneal ..."I
The holding was reaffirmed on a subsequent appeal.'"
The question of a national weight of authority on this
problem of a minimum age below which a child cannot be
held guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law
is not at all uniform. It can generally be said that the cases
hold there is an absolute minimum age, but they are not in
agreement as to where to draw the line. One text writer
has stated:
"Undoubtedly there is an irreducible minimum, per-
haps somewhere in the neighborhood of three years of
age, but it can scarcely be fixed by any rules laid down
in advance, without regard to the particular case."20
Another text concludes:
"The application of this presumption to relieve a
child who is three years, or less than three years, of age
from a charge of personal contributory negligence is
supported by the weight of authority, as might be ex-
pected in view of the extremely immature persons in-
volved, but it must be observed that some authorities
have intimated that even a person not more than three
years old may be held guilty of contributory negligence
under some circumstances."'2'
However, there are cases holding that infants of four, five,
six, and indeed, even some few holding that children of
7 149 Md. 443, 131 A. 822 (1926).
Ibid, 459.
'
9 Wash. B. & A. Elec. R. Co. v. State, 153 Md. 119, 124, 137 A. 484 (1927).
PBossz, ToRTs (1941), 231.
38 Am. Jura, NoFGiGEInE, Sec. 2D5, p. 888.
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seven, years of age are conclusively presumed incapable of
contributory negligence.2
It therefore appears that Miller v. Graff,2" has in effect
reversed the line of earlier Maryland cases and has moved
this jurisdiction away from its former very extreme posi-
tion to one more in conformity with the opinions of other
states.
As a practical matter this new holding will not make
much difference. The former rule allowed the jury to con-
sider whether a Plaintiff of four years or less was guilty of
contributory negligence. Since the standard of reasonable
care for such infants is such a slight one, it is most likely
that juries would find the standard had been met by an in-
jured child, while the Court of Appeals could hardly say
that it had not been met as a matter of law. Thus the result
produced by the new rule will in most cases be the same as
that under the old one, except that it removes the possibility
of a verdict for the Defendant in an extremely flagrant case.
STATE LAW v. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
Hughes v. Fetter'
First National Bank v. United Air Lines2
Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Company'
When a State adopts a rule of conflict of laws, the rule is
necessarily subject to the restrictions of the Federal Con-
stitution. One such restriction, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause,4 is broad in scope and has required frequent clarifi-
cation by the United States Supreme Court. Full faith and
credit isn't necessarily an inflexible blade for shearing the
sovereignty of a State in diversity situations. Under some
circumstances it contemplates room for the reasonable play
of public policy. According to the facts of each case, the
Supreme Court must decide whether or not the forum has
met the minimum Constitutional requirements in applying
a particular conflict of laws rule. Two aspects of the prob-
107 A. L. R. 4, 71, 174 A. L. R. 1080, 1103.
Supra, n. 1.
1341 U. S. 609 (1951). A 5 to 4 decision.
2342 U. S. 396 (1952).
8345 U. S. 514 (1953).
4 "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial proceedings of every other State."
U. S. Const., Art. IV, Sec. 1, Ci. 1.
1954]
